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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY M. LANE 
Plaintiff-
Appellant , 
-vs-
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, DEPARATMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, 
Defendant-
Respondent • 
Case No. 20888 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Respondent Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah (hereinafter "Board") 
substantially agreed with the facts as presented by 
Plaintiff-Appellant Randy Lane (hereinafter "Lane") as 
presented in his brief filed November 26, 1985. However, the 
Board in its brief added, inter alia, specific facts 
regarding the employer's alleged policy of requiring an 
employee to request identification from every person who 
sought to purchase beer at the employer's place of business. 
Respondent's Brief at 9. However, the Board failed to note 
that its own decision, dated August 13, 1985, from which Lane 
appeals, included a finding of fact that Lane: 
1 
...was under a duty to verify the age of 
customets who desired to purchase 
alcoholic beverages and was responsible 
to ask for ID as proof of age in all 
cases where the purchaser's age is 
questionable. (R.0021) (emphasis added). 
The Board made a finding of fact in its decision which 
supports the facts as stated by Lane. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE REASONABLENESS OF THE BOARD OF 
REVIEW'S RELIANCE ON PROPOSED RULE 
A-71-07-l:5(A) IS NOT RELEVANT SINCE THE 
BOARD OF REVIEW FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
STATUTORY PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING ACT FOR 
THE ADOPTION OF THE PROPOSED RULE. 
The Board acknowledges that UDES Proposed Rule 
A-71-07-1:5(A) "does not have the legal standing or force of 
a formally adopted rule". Respondent's Brief at 20-21. 
Instead, the Board attempts to justify the proposed rule as a 
"regulatory codification" of this Couit's holding in 
Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Security, 663 
• •• - m i , „ -• - • * * * " • •• -•- — T M n i l i ii • — ••- • j A — 
P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). Respondent's Brief at 18, 20-21. 
However, the Board's attempt to characterize the 
appropriateness of the proposed rule as a substantive issue 
misses the mark. Simply stated, whether the proposed rule is 
characterized as a "regulatory codification of this Court's 
Clearfield decision" (Petitioner's Brief at 18), an 
"interpretative guideline for deciding cases under the 'just 
cause' provision" (Petitioner's Brief at 19), or, an 
2 
articulation "in regulatory language the substantive 
provision of this Court's Clearfield decision" (Petitioner's 
Brief at 20), it ignores the fact that the proposed rule was 
not adopted pursuant to the procedural requirements of the 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
The Board does not, as it cannot, assert that the 
proposed rule is not subject to the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. Clearly the proposed rule is a "rule" 
subject to either the earlier or later Act. Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 63-46-3(4) (1953 & Supp. 1984) and Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
63-46a-2(l)(8)(a)and (b) (1953 & Supp. 1985). The labels of 
"regulatory codification", "interpretive guideline" and 
"regulatory language" committed to the proposed rule by the 
Board leave little doubt that the proposed rule "implements 
or interprets" the law and prescribes policy, thereby making 
it subject to the procedural requirements of the Act. Id. 
Lane submits that this Court must look to whether the 
proposed rule was finally adopted in accordance with the 
statutory requirements of the applicable Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. That is, whether the Board complied with the 
procedural requirements of the Act. That issue should not be 
clouded by the Board's assertion that its reliance on the 
As noted in Appellant's Brief at 7 there are two 
potentially pertinent rulemaking acts. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
63-46-1 et. seq. (1953 & Supp. 1984) and Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
63-46a-l et. seq. (1953 & Supp. 1985). The Board has not 
asserted that it has complied with the procedural 
requirements of either Act. 
3 
proposed rule was reasonable. This Court's decision in Kehl 
v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129f 1134 (Utah 1985) has 
already held that the substance of the proposed rule was 
"within the limits of reasonableness and rationality". The 
decision did not, however, address the procedural aspect 
being asserted by Lane in the instant case. See Appellant's 
Brief at 6-13. 
At pages 18-19 of its Brief, the Board attempts to 
distinguish Bushmann v. Schweiker , 676 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 
1982) by noting that in Bushmann the i ule was stricken 
because the rule had not been published for public comment as 
required by the rulemaking statute, whereas UDES Proposed 
Rule A-71-07-1:5(A) has been so published. The requirement 
that the proposed rule not be applied prior to its final 
adoption as required by the Administrative Rulemaking Act is 
no less important. It allows potentially affected persons to 
timely structure their affairs to account for new 
regulations. Therefore, Lane submits that Bushmann, and 
cases cited therein, are applicable to the instant case. See 
also, City of New York v. Diamond, 379 F.Supp. 503, 515-516 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) and cases cited therein. 
Further, the Board asserts that Lane has shown no 
prejudice by the application of the proposed rule to his 
case. It cites the dissenting opinion in Bushmann for this 
proposition. The case relied upon by the dissent in Bushmann 
discusses the applicability of the doctrine of harmless 
4 
error. U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 595 F.2d 207, 215 (5th Cir. 1979). In that case the 
court held: 
Nor can the Agency rest on the doctrine 
of harmless error. While that doctrine 
has been held applicable to review of 
agency actions, and has statutory 
sanction in the APA, it is used only 
"when a mistake of the administrative 
body is one that clearly had no bearing 
on the procedure used or the substance of 
decision reached." Braniff Airways v. 
CAB, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 399, 379 F.2d 453 
(1967). Here the Agency's error plainly 
affected the procedure used, and we 
cannot assume that there was no prejudice 
to petitioners. Absence of such 
prejudice must be clear for harmless 
error to be applicable. See Alabama 
Ass'n of Insurance Agents v. Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
533 F.2d 224, 236 (CA5, 1976), cert, 
denied, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 1448, 55 
L.Ed.2d 494 (1978); Unification Church v. 
Attorney General for the U.S., 189 
U.S.App.D.C. 92, 94-95, 581 F.2d 870, 
872-73, cert, denied, U.S. , 99 
S.Ct. 102, 58 L.Ed.2d 122 (1978); 
Haltmier v. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm'n, 554 F.2d 556, 562 (CA2, 1977). 
(emphasis added). 
Therefore, Lane submits that the procedural defect alone 
demands a reversal of the Board's decision denying him 
unemployment benefits. The failure of the Board to comply 
with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act jjs the prejudice 
to Lane. Application of a proposed rule without notice that 
the rule is final is, in and of itself, prejudice. 
Finally, the Board argues that the decision denying 
Lane benefits would have been the same under this Court's 
decision in Clearfield since the proposed rule "merely 
5 
articulates in regulatory language" the Clearfield decision. 
Respondent's Brief at 20. Suffice it to say that the 
Clearfield case did not consider the present statute which 
contains the "good cause" requirement. The case of Kehl v. 
Board of Review, Supra, in which this Court first interpreted 
the "just cause" provision of the statute, did not cite 
Clearfield. Thus, it cannot be said that the outcome under 
the proposed rule would have been the same had the Board 
applied the Clearfield rationale to the facts of the instant 
case . 
POINT II 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DECISION IS 
UNREASONABLE, IRRATIONAL AND NOT 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHETHER 
CONSIDERED UNDER THE STANDARD OF PROPOSED 
RULE A-71-07-l:5(A) OR NOT 
The Board, in its brief at pages 9, 23 and 31, 
argues that the employer's policy regarding which customers 
were to be asked for identification prior to being allowed to 
purchase beer was that every person who sought the beer 
purchase must be asked for identification. It cites, at 
pages 9 and 23 of its Brief, the testimony of the employer's 
Vice President of Operations, Mr. Tassainer, as an 
explanation of the employer's policy (R.0048) and as a 
rejection of Lane's assertion of his understanding of the 
policy, i.e. to request identification from any person who 
was attempting to purchase beer and whose age was 
questionable (R.0071). However, the Board's assertion is in 
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direct conflict with its own findings of fact in its August 
28, 1985, decision. (R.0021). That decision, in the third 
paragraph, unequivocally notes that Lane: 
.•.was under a duty to verify the age of 
customers who desired to purchase 
alcoholic beverages and was responsible 
to ask for ID as proof of age in all 
cases where the purchaser's age is 
questionable. (R.0021)(emphasis added). 
Therefore, it was the Board's own factual finding that the 
employer's policy was to require an employee to ask for 
identification from a customer prior to a beer purchase only 
if the purchaser's age was questionable. The Board cannot 
now be heard to argue that the employer's policy was to 
require identification from every customer who sought to 
purchase beer when its own findings of fact are to the 
contrary. It should also be noted that the Administrative 
Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") made the finding that the 
employer "did not have any definite policy regarding age 
verification." (R.0032). 
As noted by the Board at page 16 of its Brief, this 
Court has held that "...it is clear that not every cause for 
discharge provides a basis to deny eligibility for 
unemployment compensation." Clearfield City v. Department of 
Employment Security, 663 P.2d at 441. Further, 
disqualification does not apply where the evidence shows the 
discharge was due to inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, 
failure in good performance as the result of inability or 
incapacity, inadvertences or ordinary negligence in isolated 
7 
instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion. 
See Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review, 586 P.2d 727, 730 
(Utah 1977) and cases cited therein; Clearfield City Vo 
Department of Employment Security, 663 P.2d, at 444; and, 
UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A)(3)(a). Lane submits that 
his conduct causing the termination of his employment was of 
the type described above. 
Lane was not required by any policy of his employer 
to ask for identification from every person who sought to 
purchase beer. As found by the Board, he was required to 
request identification only from those persons whose age was 
questionable. (R.0021). The record is replete with facts 
substantiating the reason why Lane did not request 
identification from the minor who purchased the beer. In 
response to the ALJ's inquiry as to the reason Lane did not 
request identification from the minor, Lane stated: 
This person looked over 21. He was 
wearing old clothes, he had a beard, he 
had a slouched hat and he looked over 21 
to me and that is why I did not check his 
ID on this night. (R.0057). 
Both Lane and his wife further testified as to the 
circumstances surrounding the sale of the beer to the minor. 
They testified that: 
Mrs. Lane: At the time the station was 
packed. I mean fully 
packed. We had a bus load 
of kids. . . 
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Mr, Lane: Yes. The statement was 
there was nobody in the 
station and that was 
incorrect. 
Mrs. Lane: ...but there was. 
Mr. Lane: There was people in the 
station. (R.0057). 
These facts do not show callous conductf misbehavior or gross 
negligence. Nor do they show fatuous excuses. Rather, they 
establish an explanation for an isolated incident of poor-
judgment; a good faith error in discretion. The Board did 
not dispute in its August 13, 1985, decision the ALJ's 
holding that Lane "had committed an error in judgment." 
(R.0032). 
The Board would have this Court believe that Lane's 
conviction for selling beer to a minor is alone sufficient to 
justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Respondent's 
Brief at 26. However, the sole issue is whether Lane was 
discharged for "just cause" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
35-4-5(b)(1). Lane's guilt or innocence of the violation is 
not conclusive of his ineligibility for benefits. There is 
no requirement that there be a lack of criminal "guilt" or 
"mens tea" to establish eligibility for unemployment 
compensation. This is especially true in the instant case 
where the statute violated is one which is malum prohibitum. 
Furthermore, the Board submits that if Lane thought 
the charge against him was improper "he should have pled not 
guilty to the charge and fought to establish his innocence." 
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Respondent's Brief at 26. However, the record is clear that 
Lane would have preferred to do just that but, he was unable 
to stay in Parowan long enough after his employment 
termination to contest the matter. (R.0046 & 0058). 
It is further submitted by the Board that the 
discharge of Lane was necessary to avoid actual or potential 
harm to the employer's rightful interest. Respondent's Brief 
at 29. The Board has made no showing of actual harm to the 
employer. Rather, it asserts that the termination was 
necessary to avoid potential harm and relies on Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 32-8-53 (1953 & Supp. 1984)f of the Utah Liquor 
Control Act for that proposition. Respondent's Brief at 29. 
However, that section jeopardizes the employer's business 
license only if the employer acts with "knowledge, consent, 
connivance or acquiescence" with the employee's violation of 
the Act. Lane agrees with the Board's assertion that it is 
imperative for an employer to have and enforce stringent 
policies against violations of the Utah Liquor Control Act. 
However, in this case there were no such policies that were 
ever communicated to Lane. In response to the ALJ's question 
whether he knew that a violation of a company policy that 
prohibited the sale of beer to minors would result in 
automatic termination, Lane testified: 
No sir, I did not. No. I was told that 
there, that numerous people at the 
company had received warnings before they 
were fired...(R. 0054) 
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The only showing that the policy was ever communicated to 
Lane is revealed in the following noncommittal response by 
the employer's representative: 
Judge: And could you attest that 
Mr. Lane was advised when 
he was hired or subsequent 
to his hire date that he 
was advised of that 
policy? 
Mr. Tassainer: I can attest to the fact 
that Mr. Okay had advised 
the manager there and the 
employees there of 
violations that had 
occurred previously. 
(R.0050) 
While it is true that the employer must diligently 
ensure that liquor laws are being complied withf it must also 
ensure that it establishes policies and that employees are 
aware of those policies. While in the instant case the 
employer may feel justified in terminating Lane it does not 
necessarily follow that the termination also results in a 
finding of "just cause" and an accompanying denial of 
benefits. Indeed, as provided by Proposed Rule 
A71-07-l:5(A)(3)(a): 
If the conduct was an isolated incident 
of poor judgment and there is no 
expectation that the conduct will be 
continued or repeated, potential harm may 
not be shown and therefore it is not 
necessary to discharge the employee. 
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This same requirement is found in Continental Oil Co. v. 
Board of Review, 568 P.2d at 730. 
The Board cites the Court to Kehl Vo Board of 
Review, supra, as controlling authority in the instant case. 
Respondent's Brief at 27. In the Kehl case the employee was 
terminated for a violation of the employer's safety rules. 
Specifically, the employee failed to follow pioper procedures 
for crossing railroad tracks while operating a forklift 
transporting rocket motors containing up to 10,000 pounds of 
explosives. The rules were clear and express and the 
employee had knowledge of them. The Court heLd that the 
egregious violation of the employer's safety tule met, 
...the culpability requirement because 
the wrongness of the conduct, when viewed 
in the context of the employment and the 
potentially devastating effects on the 
employer's rights, was severe and because 
the discharge was necessary to avoid the 
potential harm to the employer's 
interests that another violation would 
cause. 
Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d at 1134. Lane submits that 
the facts in the instant case do not rise to the level of 
"wrongness of conduct" that the facts did in Kehl. Any 
potential harm to the employer in this case would not have 
devastating and severe effects on the employer's rights. 
Indeed, the assertion that the employer could lose its 
business license under Sec. 32-8-53 of the Utah Liquor 
Control Act could result only through the employer's 
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"knowledge, consent, connivance or acquiescence." Misconduct 
on the part of the employee alone does not subject the 
employer to a loss of its business license under Sec. 
32-8-53. The Board has shown no facts which would manifest 
"devastating" and "severe" potential harm of the type 
contemplated by the Kehl decision. 
Finally, the best way the employer could protect 
itself if it feared that its conduct could be construed as 
acquiescence is to establish a formal policy concerning the 
sale of beer and enforce that policy. That way the employer 
could protect itself under both the Liquor Control Act and 
the Employment Security Act, while at the same time treating 
employees fairly. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board of Review's application of UDES Proposed 
Rule A71-01-1:5(A) is invalid and unenforceable because it 
was not adopted pursuant to the requirements of the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act and, therefore, its decision 
should be reversed. The error is not harmless since the 
mistake had a direct bearing on the procedure used. However, 
even assuming arguendo that the Court can reach the merits, 
the Board of Review's decision is unreasonable, irrational 
and not supported by substantial evidence, whether the 
proposed rule is applied or not. For these reasons Lane 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Board of 
Review's decision and enter an order that he is entitled, as 
13 
a matter of law, to unemployment compensation benefits from 
April 14, 1985, until he is no longer otherwise eligible, 
DATED this Z3^fay of January, 1986, 
Respectfully submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVECES, INC. 
CURTIS K. CHILI 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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